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In the context of IS consulting, this study applies the principles of engaged scholarship to examine 
the perennial problem of constraining opportunism. Using constructs proposed by the theory of 
relationship constraints, this paper examines the relative effectiveness of different constraint 
mechanisms on information systems (IS) consultants in China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, 
for projects with different levels of information asymmetry, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge. 
While we found support in all of these countries for the salience of these dimensions, there are 
important distinctions in the effectiveness of different constraints among the countries. Generally, 
consulting clients in the United States believe that social constraints are more effective, while those 
in China and Saudi Arabia favor legal constraints. Our research suggests that these findings are a 
result of differences in legal systems and the foundations of social norm formation. Our findings 
highlight the importance of tacit knowledge and information asymmetry (over explicit knowledge), 
and we provide a conceptual model for an IS-interventionist approach to reducing opportunism. 
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1 Introduction 
Although there has been a consistent call for 
information systems research (IS) to be applicable 
(e.g., Davenport & Markus, 1999, p. 19; Rosemann & 
Vessey, 2008), many leading journals are clearly 
oriented toward contributions that advance theory. In 
this study, we show that it is possible to simultaneously 
address both goals by applying the principles of 
engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007, p. ix), which 
address complex social problems by incorporating 
multiple stakeholders in the research process. When 
practitioners are engaged, IS research can identify 
solutions to issues that continuously vex IS practice. It 
can potentially detect those interventions that are likely 
to be effective under specific contexts. Engaged 
scholarship responds to Simon’s (1996) argument for 
research that generates knowledge and identifies 
actions that create value for practitioners. In this 
article, we engage with IS consulting clients to learn 
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how they effectively constrain consultant opportunism 
for a range of IS projects. Given that IS consulting is a 
USD 383 billion market,1 many practitioners should be 
interested in learning how to more effectively manage 
vendor relationships. 
Engaged scholarship is a four-step process: (1) ground 
the research in a problem of practice; (2) identify 
alternative theories that address the problem; (3) 
conduct research to evaluate the theoretical options to 
identify effective solutions; (4) apply the research 
findings to the problem (Van de Ven, 2007, p. ix). We 
further propose that engaged scholarship becomes 
more valuable when it identifies a dependent variable 
that is actionable and applies a research method that 
captures practitioner knowledge grounded in current 
practices. We next introduce our research according to 
the guidance provided by the preceding steps.  
1.1 A Problem of Practice: Constraining 
Opportunism in IS Consulting 
Opportunism is a persistent and complex social 
problem. In general, humans demonstrate a penchant 
for acting opportunistically and, at the same time, fear 
the same from others. Attempts to restrict opportunism 
in the form of legal and ethical codes, for example, 
have actively shaped societies for millennia (Rose, 
2011, p. 27). Nevertheless, opportunism continues to 
impose a societal cost. Opportunism is defined as “self-
interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, pp. 47-
48), and implies intentionally engaging in actions that 
a self-aware person knows are wrong (blatant) or 
refusing to share relevant information despite a belief 
that sharing is obligatory (passive) (Wathne & Heide, 
2000). Opportunism differs from mere profit 
maximizing because it takes advantage of a trusting 
relationship to advance self-interest. There is a need for 
mechanisms for detecting and constraining 
opportunism due to its potential financial and 
operational impacts. Our increasingly global and 
networked economy is characterized by higher levels 
of dependency, and thus greater exposure to 
opportunism (Romar, 2004). 
Opportunism comes with high social costs because of 
the need to develop mechanisms to constrain it (such 
as a law enforcement system). It can slow the 
economic growth of companies (Ouchi, 1980) and 
even negatively impact the progress of nations (Hill, 
1995; Knack & Zak, 2003), in that nations are 
responsible for managing the problems created by their 
societies (for example, handling environmental waste). 
The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin, 1968) illustrates 
some of the critical social issues associated with 
opportunism (Rose, 2011). Given the high social costs 
                                                          
1 http//clients1.ibisworld.com/reports/us/industry/ataglance.a
spx?indid=1415 
of opportunism, identifying effective constraint 
mechanisms will benefit many and ameliorate the 
associated drag on organizational performance. 
In the management consulting domain, Frederick 
Taylor, widely viewed as the grandfather of 
management consulting, was known to fabricate data, 
lie to clients, and embellish his results (Stewart, 2009). 
Today’s management consultants have been known to 
continue Taylor’s reprehensible behavior (Stewart, 
2009). Opportunistic consultants are also active in the 
field of IS consulting. For example, in 2007, a large 
technology firm, under a USD 1.7 billion contract with 
the US federal government to install and monitor seven 
intrusion detection devices, reported that all seven 
devices had been installed. However, it was later 
revealed that only three had, in fact, been installed, 
when four of the devices were found under the desk of 
the consulting project manager (Nakashima & Krebs, 
2007).  
IS consulting offers fertile ground for the study of 
opportunism because the frequent use of coproduction, 
in which the consultant and the client cooperate to 
deliver an information system or service (Dawson, 
Watson, Boudreau, & Pitt, 2016), is necessitated by 
bilateral information asymmetry. Both parties must 
contribute different expertise for a successful 
engagement. For example, while clients typically seek 
consultants’ information advantage in areas such as 
industry and technology, consultants may need to mine 
their clients’ knowledge base about organizational 
operations and problem domains. 
A parsimonious set of human behavioral universals 
(Lawrence, 2007; Lawrence & Nohria, 2002) identifies 
four common features of human nature: the drive to 
acquire, bond, comprehend, and defend. The drive to 
acquire (goods, reputation, etc.) is most likely to 
trigger opportunism, but it is balanced by the drive to 
bond, since lasting social relationships anchored in 
trust are typically viewed as beneficial. Due to its 
likely foundation in basic human nature, opportunism 
is a problem that seems to afflict all societies and has 
been reported in a number of different countries, 
including (among others) China (Wong, Tjosvold, & 
Yu, 2005; Zhou & Xu, 2012), India (Besley, Pande, & 
Rao, 2012), Saudi Arabia (Al-Khatib, Malshe, & 
AbdulKader, 2008), Egypt (Blaydes, 2006), Brazil 
(Kogan, 2006), Japan (Hennart, 1991), South Africa 
(van den Heuvel, 2008) and the United States (Lyon & 
Mayo, 2005). Consequently, laws and social norms, 
such as promises, oaths, and religious conventions, 
have evolved to constrain opportunism and other 
undesirable behaviors (Brown & Duguid, 1991).  
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In China, strong relational bonds (guanxi in Chinese) 
are often cited as an effective constraint due to a 
pervasive lack of trust in the Chinese legal system 
(Hwang, 1997, 1998). However, strong relational 
bonds are not a given and a legal system is clearly still 
needed to curb opportunism (Wong et al., 2005). 
Similar mixtures of legal and social constraints have 
been seen in highly divergent societies, including 
modern Jewish diamond merchants, 19th-century 
California cattlemen, and 11th-century rug merchants 
(Richman, 2004). However, both types of 
constraints—legal and social—have their weaknesses. 
For example, legal constraints are, by necessity, 
incomplete (Hart & Moore, 1999) because they cannot 
easily codify the required tacit knowledge present in 
some business relationships, such as consulting 
assignments (Bassellier, Reich, & Benbasat, 2001; 
Dawson et al., 2016). As such, the levels of tacit and 
explicit knowledge in a consulting engagement are key 
determinants of contract specificity and the constraint 
of opportunism in this context (Dawson, Watson, & 
Boudreau, 2010). However, social constraints are 
prone to misunderstandings, especially across different 
societies, and may not be enforceable in a court of law 
(Sharma, 1997), rendering them potentially less useful. 
1.2 Theoretical Options: Legal or Social 
Constraints  
Game theory and information theory are unifying 
frameworks of modern economics (Tirole, 2017). 
Agency theory, one aspect of information theory, 
asserts that agents differ according to the information 
they hold and that they use information for personal 
advantage (Tirole, 2017). Agency theory prioritizes 
legal contracts based on the belief that a principal 
creating an enforceable legal contract will constrain an 
opportunistic agent with an information asymmetry 
advantage (Eisenhardt, 1989b).2 Agency theory asserts 
that a principal can create and enforce a contract in 
order to limit the actions of an agent or to align the 
agent’s goals and actions with those of the principal. 
However, legal constraints are problematic since a 
complete contract (one that specifies all possible 
answers to all potential problems) is an unrealistic goal 
and most contracts only cover the most important 
problems (Walden, 2005).  
According to the principal-professional perspective, 
professionals are believed to have an information edge 
over principals because of their tacit knowledge, which 
is often the reason they are hired. This advantage can 
often not be surmounted through means of a legal 
constraint (Sharma, 1997). Accordingly, principals 
                                                          
2 We recognize that agency theory also suggests the use of 
clan control, which is a social constraint. However, clan 
control requires the existence of a group that shares a 
may lack the requisite knowledge to create and enforce 
a contract and must rely on social constraints to prevent 
opportunism (Sharma, 1997). Thus, the principal-
professional lens discounts legal constraints as 
effective mechanisms to control opportunism and 
focuses solely on social constraints. Indeed, numerous 
social constraints are commonly seen in IS consulting 
(see Appendix A). However, social constraints 
typically lack legal enforceability, and this may make 
them less palatable for both professionals and 
principals. As such, social constraints may also have 
limited effectiveness.  
The theory of relationship constraints (TRC) (Dawson 
et al., 2010) argues that the constraint of opportunism 
requires the joint application of both agency theory and 
the principal-professional lens, but there has been 
limited testing of this proposed amalgamation of two 
theories. In particular, TRC has not investigated 
whether national differences are pertinent, which is 
especially important for a globalized business. 
Organizations that operate internationally need to be 
aware of variations in the effectiveness of opportunism 
constraints across national and cultural divides. It 
would be imprudent to presume that constraint 
effectiveness is globally uniform. Companies already 
know that in areas such as marketing and sales, 
national differences often require major adaptation of 
successful domestic practices. Research that alerts 
organizations to national differences in constraining 
opportunism could help companies avoid poor vendor 
relationships and project cost overruns.  
1.3 A Dependent Variable: Effective 
Opportunism Constraint 
Legal and social constraints set the framework for the 
implementation of specific opportunism constraints, 
such as a purchase order or code of ethics. Variations 
in circumstances, such as the level of information 
asymmetry, will likely determine the effectiveness of 
such constraints. Yet, we were unable to find research 
providing guidance on matching a constraint to a 
particular situation, particularly for diverse national 
settings. Given that many companies already address 
this on a regular basis by investigating their preferred 
constraints across a variety of scenarios, we can access 
their collective wisdom in this regard.  
Many business activities, such as IS outsourcing 
(Bapni, Gupta, Ray, & Singh, 2016), are exposed to 
information asymmetry and its consequences. Because 
constraining opportunism remains an important and 
common goal, and this does not describe the market-based 
relationship between clients and consultants, the domain of 
interest in this study. 
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enduring managerial problem, an investigation of the 
relative perceived effectiveness of constraints in 
different circumstances and countries can contribute to 
a better understanding of how to mitigate the effects of 
opportunism. Particularly in a global economy, 
customers and organizations in one country are often 
dependent on the business practices of suppliers or 
partners in another (Romar, 2004); as such, it is 
important that one not assume that such practices are 
invariant across borders. In this article, we address 
national differences in constraining opportunism3 in the 
context of seven different situations in three different 
countries by conducting a study of IS consulting 
engagements in China, Saudi Arabia, and the US.  
Specifically, we ask:  
• In the context of IS consulting, what differences 
are there in the perceived effectiveness of 
opportunism constraints in different situations? 
• In the context of IS consulting, what differences 
are there in the perceived effectiveness of 
opportunism constraints in different countries? 
• In the context of IS consulting, what factors 
might explain national differences in perceived 
constraint effectiveness?  
We study the constraint of opportunism in the IS 
consulting domain because, among other things, IS 
consulting is characterized by information asymmetry, 
uses both tacit and explicit knowledge, and uses a 
variety of legal and social constraint mechanisms. 
Additionally, this domain allows for a focus on the 
service side of IS  (Pitt, Watson, & Kavan, 1995) and 
examines an oft-neglected “gray area” in IS scholarship 
(Whinston & Geng, 2004). Furthermore, in advanced 
economies, IS consulting is a major business that 
employs many IS professionals. For example, IBM 
Global Services, the world’s largest business and 
technology consultant, employs over 190,000 people in 
more than 160 countries and had a revenue of USD 49 
billion in 2015. Included in this figure is USD 21.9 
billion of outsourcing revenue.4 Attracted by a global IS 
consulting market revenue estimated at USD 383 
billion, 5  of which outsourcing is a considerable 
component, other former predominantly hardware or 
software companies (e.g., HP and Dell) have followed 
IBM’s lead and reinvented themselves as, primarily, IS 
consulting services. Many major accounting companies 
(e.g., PwC) also have practices focused on multiple 
aspects of the IS consulting business. 
                                                          
3  While the literature identifies two major forms of 
opportunism, blatant and passive, because of the 
understudied nature of IS consulting opportunism we focus 
on the general problem rather than a specific type of 
opportunism.  
1.4 Conduct the Research to Evaluate 
Theoretical Options 
To answer the aforementioned research questions, we 
selected a policy-capturing approach followed by a 
qualitative inquiry. Policy-capturing studies use realistic 
scenarios to discern how individuals make decisions in 
response to a series of stimuli (Aiman-Smith, Scullen, & 
Barr, 2002). They are used to understand and determine 
how organizational decision makers process 
information to make evaluative judgments (Karren & 
Barringer, 2002; Zedeck, 1977). As one of the four basic 
forms of engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007), 
policy capturing is an appropriate technique for 
design/policy evaluation research, because it examines 
normative questions related to the practical professional 
problem of constraining opportunism. We seek to 
clarify the relative efficacy of common alternatives for 
limiting opportunism. 
By focusing on what options experienced decision 
makers would take in well-specified practical scenarios, 
the researcher can both test theory—because of the 
cause and effect relationship design of a policy-
capturing study—and learn what experienced 
practitioners have found is effective. Thus, potential 
findings should generate applicable knowledge. 
Typically, engagement conjures an image of qualitative 
analysis and field interviews and observations, but 
policy capturing can also engage practitioners because it 
reveals their decisions in prescribed situations. In this 
study, we engage practitioners by asking them to react 
to a series of scenarios based on situations extracted 
from practice. We identify practitioner decisions in a 
structured fashion that lends itself to quantitative 
analysis, thus meeting the precept that engaged 
scholarship is informed by the interpretations of others 
(Van de Ven, 2007). 
Also, in the spirit of engaged scholarship, following the 
conduct of this policy-capturing approach, we took the 
extra step of returning to our respondents to elicit 
additional information, allowing us to flesh out our 
findings. We were interested in hearing anecdotes of 
consultant opportunism (and what was done), to see if 
this could add color to the results of our quantitative 
inquiry. In addition, we surmised that this extra step 
could only add to the trustworthiness of our results 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985), and more specifically, that by 
triangulating our quantitative results with this 
qualitative inquiry, we would improve both the 
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1.5 Summary 
Succinctly, this research investigates the problem of 
opportunism in IS consulting in three countries by 
examining two theoretical interventions in the form of 
either legal constraints (agency theory) or social 
constraints (principal-professional lens). We use a 
policy-capturing approach to determine what 
experienced decision makers deem effective 
opportunism constraints and follow up with a 
qualitative inquiry to shed greater light on the findings.  
In the next section, we review the relevant literature 
and leverage it to develop a research model and 
propositions. Then, we present our methodological 
approach and follow this with our findings. Finally, we 
discuss these findings, highlight our contributions, 
identify the limitations of our research, and offer 
suggestions for the future development of engaged 
scholarship for IS issues and advice for IS consultants 
and other professionals who work in the information 
systems field.6  
2 Theoretical Development 
Early economic views of man were homo economicus 
(fully rational) or homo psychologicus (boundedly 
rational) (Williamson, 1993). Consequently, 
opportunistic behavior was viewed as fixed and was 
often ignored to simplify managerial and economic 
analyses (Asian Productivity, 2001; Wathne & Heide, 
2000; Williamson, 1993). However, opportunism is 
now viewed as an often-present factor in business 
relationships, including IS consulting, that requires 
explanation rather than merely exclusion (Wathne & 
Heide, 2000) and mitigation.  
2.1 Information Asymmetry 
The root cause of opportunism is information 
asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970), a foundational concept of 
information economics.7 When there is a lack of full 
transparency in a business transaction, the party 
favored by the asymmetry has an opening for 
opportunistic action. Thus, modern society has 
developed mechanisms, such as reporting standards for 
public companies and insider trading rules, that 
attempt to limit information asymmetry in certain 
areas. The development of rating mechanisms for apps 
such as Uber is an opportunism reduction mechanism 
because it can reduce information asymmetry for both 
                                                          
6  Based on www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
consultant 
7 Akerlof’s 1970 paper is the first in The Economist’s series 




buyers and sellers. It illustrates the potential of using 
IS for information asymmetry management 
(Economist, 2016). 
We can gain a deeper understand the information 
asymmetry by recognizing that there are two types of 
knowledge: tacit and explicit knowledge. In an IS 
consulting engagement, our domain of interest, these 
forms of knowledge are key determinants of contract 
specificity and the constraint of opportunism (Dawson 
et al., 2010). 
We study general variables, information asymmetry, 
and knowledge types, which are fundamental to 
understanding opportunism, in general, and its role in 
IS consulting, an information-intensive business, in 
particular. We aim to contribute theoretical and 
applicable knowledge to a key issue, opportunism, in 
an important context, IS consulting, where the threat of 
opportunism dictates that essentially all assignments 
are governed by a contract of some sort. The focus on 
information-oriented antecedents in the information-
laden setting of IS consulting will allow us to generate 
a context-specific theory (Burton-Jones & Volkoff, 
2017) that aligns with our applicability goal. 
2.2 Constraints on Opportunism Across 
Countries 
While the level of opportunism varies across countries 
(Sharp, 1994), it is a common and significant problem. 
As such, various legal and social mechanisms have 
arisen to constrain opportunism (Appendix A) or 
reduce its impact. Within an overarching 
infrastructure, lawyers and economists (e.g., Hart, 
1988; Hölmstrom, 1979) 8  have designed contracts 
intended to align agents and principals, which have 
been market tested in varying situations, generating 
considerable knowledge about the effectiveness of 
constraints in differing situations, such as those 
varying along the key factors of information 
asymmetry and knowledge type. As far as we can 
ascertain, this knowledge has not been publicly 
published for the scope of IS consulting projects—a 
lack that this study aims to rectify. 
Legal constraints are generally enforceable using a 
nation’s legal system (Richman, 2004). Civil law is 
probably the most widespread form of legal system and 
is interpreted rather than determined by a legal body. It 
relies on a comprehensive legal code that specifies the 
8  Awardees of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic 
Sciences in 2016 for their work on contract theory.  
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law, the applicable procedure, and the punishment for 
breaking the law (The Robbins Collection, 2017). 
Several approaches to civil law exist, including those 
of France, Germany, Scandinavia, and China (which is 
home to a mixture of civil and socialist law based on 
German and Soviet influences). 
Common law, the prime basis of law in the US,9 is 
based on decisions by judges and is supported by a 
legislature that can rescind or amend old laws and pass 
new ones (The Robbins Collection, 2017). Common 
law has its roots in England and, not surprisingly, is 
commonly practiced in the former colonies of the 
British Empire. In contrast to civil law, common law is 
generally uncodified and is based on prior legal 
precedence. Furthermore, laws can be influenced to 
varying degrees by religion (e.g., Islam in Saudi 
Arabia) or by a dominant philosophical belief (e.g., 
Confucianism in China). 
Social constraints are extralegal devices that exist 
outside of the rule of law but, in many cases, can be 
more powerful than legal constraints (Richman, 2004). 
Social constraints evolved because people were in 
need more of transactional rather than contractual 
protections, and it is widely recognized that social 
constraints can supplement or even be superior to legal 
constraints (Richman, 2004). As such, legal and social 
constraints can coexist and those involved in business 
transactions can choose between them or construct 
combinations.  
2.3 Research Model and Proposition 
Development 
Agency theory, the principal-professional lens, and 
TRC all ignore the potential role of national legal and 
social structures in influencing the effectiveness of 
constraint mechanisms. We introduce the notion of 
“national setting” because in a global business world, 
executives need to understand how to constrain 
opportunism under varying legal regimes, according to 
different social norms and different degrees of 
information asymmetry, and in terms of explicit versus 
tacit knowledge. Based on TRC (Dawson et al., 2010), 
we propose a model that incorporates these variables 
and their influence on constraint effectiveness (Figure 
1).  
In the following subsections, we offer individual 
propositions related to information asymmetry and 
explicit and tacit knowledge constructs, and then offer 
an additional proposition related to national 
differences. Since opportunism is a general societal 
problem, we express the propositions at a conceptual 
level in terms of agents and principals because these 
concepts can be tested in multiple contexts. From these 
propositions, we later generate hypotheses for the IS 
consulting context, essentially substituting client for 
principal and consultant for agent. We begin now by 
discussing the dependent variable.
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
 
                                                          
9 This is true for US federal law and for most state laws. 
Some states, notably California and Louisiana, are primarily 
based on Mexican or Spanish civil law (respectively) 
reflecting their heritage as a territory of those countries. 
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2.3.1 Perceived Constraint Effectiveness 
Following TRC, we recognize that the goal of both 
principals and agents is to constrain the opportunism 
of the other party—though, in this case, we are focused 
on the principal. As explained earlier, society has 
developed institutions and sanctions to reduce the 
pervasive problem of opportunism. When entering an 
engagement, diligent parties will establish mechanisms 
to reciprocally deter opportunism. In order to limit 
costs, both parties will be interested in identifying the 
most effective constraint mechanisms rather than 
implementing a wide range of such mechanisms. 
Instituting a constraint mechanism requires one 
organization (e.g., the agent)  to infer its impact on the 
behavior of another organization (e.g., the principal). 
2.3.2 Role of Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry is the fuel of opportunism 
(Akerlof, 1970). If information were completely 
available and understandable by both parties in a 
transaction, it would be difficult for either to be 
opportunistic (Williamson, 1973). However, a lack of 
equally shared information diminishes the ability of a 
disadvantaged party to detect and thus deter 
opportunistic acts by the other. Thus, when the level of 
information asymmetry is high, the advantaged party 
has less fear of being caught committing an 
opportunistic act.10 
When the level of information asymmetry favoring the 
agent is high, it is challenging for a principal to assess 
the risk, time, and cost associated with creating an 
effective contract (Battigalli & Maggi, 2000). Indeed, 
contract writers suffer from bounded rationality and 
cannot reasonably foresee all possible future events 
(Williamson, 1985), especially when information 
asymmetry is high. Thus, in practice, most legal 
constraints are deficient in some ways, and only the 
most important aspects of the contractual relationship 
are defined (Walden, 2005). Accordingly, principals 
are likely to realize that legal constraints become less 
effective as information asymmetry favoring the agent 
increases. 
The same logic can be applied to social constraints. 
Indeed, if the level of information asymmetry favoring 
the agent is high, the principal might be unable to 
detect opportunism, and the agent may be able to cloak 
opportunistic acts. In other words, the principal will 
have a hard time recognizing opportunism and thus 
                                                          
10  Information asymmetry can be bilateral, an issue not 
considered by either an agency theory or principal-
professional lens, with both parties holding an information 
asymmetry advantage. In a software development project, for 
example, a client can have an information asymmetry 
advantage over the consultant because the client knows more 
about its organization’s readiness for the new system (a 
will not be able to obstruct it by sharing details of 
opportunistic actions with others in the community. 
Thus, social constraints are likely to be perceived as 
less effective by the principal when the level of 
information asymmetry favoring the agent is high. We 
thus posit that: 
P1a: A principal will perceive that both legal and 
social constraints on agents become less effective 
as information asymmetry favoring agents 
increases. 
Conversely, when asymmetry favoring the agent is 
low, a principal is likely to believe that it can codify all 
the relevant dimensions of the relationship, and thus a 
contract will be superior to social constraints due to a 
principal’s ability to use the legal system to enforce a 
well-specified contract. Given the choice between a 
relatively complete contract that is enforceable in a 
court of law and a legally unenforceable social 
constraint, we posit that a principal will prefer a legal 
constraint.  
P1b: When information asymmetry favoring agents is 
low, a principal will perceive legal constraints as 
relatively more effective than social constraints. 
However, when the level of information asymmetry 
favoring the agent is high, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to capture all the salient dimensions of a 
contract. Since social constraints are not as prone to 
being challenged by higher levels of information 
asymmetry, they are not as likely to lose effectiveness 
in this scenario. Therefore, although principals will 
perceive that both legal and social constraints become 
less effective as information asymmetry favoring the 
agent increases, they will perceive the latter to be more 
effective in this scenario.  
P1c: When information asymmetry favoring an agent 
is high, a principal will perceive social 
constraints to be relatively more effective than 
legal constraints. 
2.3.3 Explicit Knowledge 
The type of knowledge necessary for a project is also 
an important determinant of opportunism. Explicit 
knowledge can be captured, formalized, and codified 
into documents, procedures, or databases (Bassellier et 
al., 2001; Smith, 2001). With effort, reasonably 
educated people can learn relevant explicit knowledge. 
For instance, most office employees are capable of 
factor influencing price and timing) while the consultant has 
an information asymmetry advantage over the client because 
it knows more about the skills of its staff (a factor influencing 
project success). In this research, we solely focus on the 
information asymmetry advantage held by the agent (the 
consultant in this case) since that is the asymmetry advantage 
that the principal (the client) needs to guard against.  
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absorbing the applicable rules of spreadsheet operation 
and manipulation. By contrast, tacit knowledge implies 
the know-how and judgment that accompanies explicit 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1967). In terms of our example, it 
is knowing when a spreadsheet is a good fit for the 
problem at hand rather than simply applying a 
spreadsheet as a solution to all problems. Tacit 
knowledge is about knowing when and how to apply 
explicit knowledge and is commonly gained through 
experience. Tacit and explicit knowledge coexist at 
varying levels in organizational relationships.  
Because explicit knowledge can be codified, it is easier 
to capture in a legal contract. However, this comes with 
an important caveat. When explicit knowledge is 
voluminous, it becomes virtually impossible to fully 
capture, thus rendering a contract incomplete (Hart & 
Moore, 1988). Thus, we expect the effectiveness of 
legal constraints to diminish as the level of explicit 
knowledge increases.  
P2a: A principal will perceive that the effectiveness of 
legal constraints on agents decreases as the level 
of explicit knowledge increases. 
Social constraints present a different situation than 
legal constraints under high versus low explicit 
knowledge. While capturing high levels of explicit 
knowledge in a contract is a challenge, we foresee no 
similar case for social constraints. As such, we posit 
that there will be no difference in the effectiveness of 
social constraints under low versus high levels of 
explicit knowledge.  
P2b: A principal will perceive the effectiveness of 
social constraints on agents to be independent of 
the level of explicit knowledge. 
Because of their enforceability, we posit that legal 
constraints will be preferable to social constraints 
when the level of explicit knowledge is low. However, 
social constraints will not lose potency under 
conditions of higher explicit knowledge and thus will 
be perceived to be more effective when the level of 
explicit knowledge is high.  
P2c: When explicit knowledge is low, a principal will 
perceive legal constraints on agents to be 
relatively more effective than social constraints. 
P2d: When explicit knowledge is high, a principal will 
perceive social constraints on agents to be 
relatively more effective than legal constraints. 
2.3.4 Tacit Knowledge 
Tacit knowledge cannot be easily codified, and this 
impacts the perceived effectiveness of legal constraints 
when circumstances require high levels of tacit 
knowledge, which is often why consultants are hired. 
For example, a consultant who has implemented 
cybersecurity strategies for multiple companies gains 
considerable expertise, or tacit knowledge, that some 
clients see as valuable because of the risk and 
complexity associated with cybersecurity. If the 
conditions of the exchange cannot be satisfactorily 
defined and codified, the lack of specificity of a 
contract will limit its constraining power, so the 
perceptions of legal constraint effectiveness should be 
lower when the level of tacit knowledge is high. 
We make a similar argument for social constraints. 
When the level of tacit knowledge is high, the situation 
is more complex and equivocal, and thus 
transgressions are more difficult to air in a social 
network. Thus, social constraints will also become less 
effective when the level of tacit knowledge is high. 
P3a: A principal will perceive that both legal and 
social constraints on agents become less effective 
with higher levels of tacit knowledge. 
Under low levels of tacit knowledge, we repeat the 
argument that legal constraints will be more effective 
since a limited amount of tacit knowledge may be 
sufficiently defined in a contract. However, as required 
tacit knowledge increases, the limitations of legal 
constraints (difficulty of codifiability) become more 
acute. However, we do not expect social constraints to 
face as much reduction in effectiveness in this 
scenario. Higher levels of tacit knowledge are much 
more challenging for legal versus social constraints.  
P3b: When tacit knowledge is low, a principal will 
perceive legal constraints on agents to be 
relatively more effective than social constraints. 
P3c: When tacit knowledge is high, a principal will 
perceive social constraints on agents to be 
relatively more effective than legal constraints.  
2.3.5 National Differences 
National culture, which is defined as the homogeneity 
of characteristics that separates one human group from 
another, provides a society’s characteristic profile with 
respect to norms, values, and institutions, and affords 
an understanding of how societies manage exchanges 
(Hofstede, 2001). However, studies of national culture 
can be problematic. First, many studies use faulty logic 
and simplistically credit national culture for the 
differences found between the results for two different 
countries (Ratner, 2003). For example, if country A 
and country B differ on the individualism-collectivism 
divide, any differences found in a cross-country 
analysis are often attributed to this cultural difference 
rather than other potential explanatory factors. Second, 
cultural variables are treated as abstract concepts rather 
than the concrete context in which the variable exists 
(Ratner, 2003). Collectivism and gender, for example, 
mean dramatically different things in different 
contexts. As Fiske notes (2002), collectivism can be 
either a true bond (e.g., a voluntary fraternal 
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organization), a familial duty (e.g., attending a 
religious service) or a detested obligation (e.g., paying 
taxes). Without context, the meaning vanishes. As 
Triandis points out (2001, p. 35), “Korean collectivism 
is not the same as the collectivism of the Israeli 
kibbutz” and then goes on to identify 60 attributes by 
which collectivist cultures vary (Ratner, 2003). Third, 
no culture is monolithic and treating them as such is 
overly simplistic. Germany is identified by some as 
more individualistic than Hong Kong (e.g., Hofstede, 
1991), but 63% of Germans self-identify as 
collectivists while 55% of people in Hong Kong self-
identify as individualistic (Triandis, 2001). Finally, 
statistically significant quantitative differences can be 
quite small, thus overselling minor differences 
between cultures (Ratner, 2003). In short, using culture 
as an explanatory variable is often a poor choice. 
We take a different approach by focusing on the means 
by which sovereign powers constrain opportunism, for 
example, through laws. Key national differences arise 
from the basis of a legal system (e.g., civil, common, 
or religious) and the confidence that citizens have in it. 
According to a 2014 Gallup poll, slightly over 50% of 
adults worldwide report confidence in their legal 
system. Confidence varies from a high of 65% (Asia 
not including China) to a low of 28% (the former 
Soviet Union) (Rochelle & Loschky, 2014). Forty-
seven percent of respondents from North America and 
the Middle East reported confidence in their respective 
legal systems although the lack of confidence was 
much higher in North America (52% reported no 
confidence and less than 1% refused to answer) than in 
the Middle East (38% reported no confidence and 15% 
refused to answer). The Chinese Communist Party has 
acknowledged issues within its legal system because of 
weak enforcement, lack of transparency, and high 
levels of corruption (Chin & Areddy, 2014).  
Because of the lack of full confidence in their 
respective legal systems, principals often rely, at least 
partially, on social constraints to complement legal 
constraints. We suspect that the effectiveness of social 
constraints varies from country to country due, in part, 
to the religious or philosophical underpinnings of the 
respective societies, as well as the strength and 
unanimity of beliefs present in the relevant country. 
For example, religious loyalty is closely tied to 
kinship, and a believer is more likely to trust someone 
professing strong faith in the same religion (in-group 
membership) than an out-group member (Beit-
Hallahmi 2015). Hence, the prevalence of a single 
religion or belief structure within a country might 
foster stronger social constraints than would a more 
diverse culture.  
Further, religious beliefs can drive the development of 
social norms, which are self-reinforcing (Bicchieri & 
Mercier, 2014). In populations as diverse as gang 
members (Matza, 1964), prison guards (Klofas & 
Toch, 1982) and prison inmates (Benaquisto & Freed, 
1996), members will tend to adhere to the social norms 
even if they believe these are wrong or too strict 
(Bicchieri & Mercier, 2014). Not surprisingly, some of 
these social norms are often codified into law; 
however, the public will not support or follow the law 
if it veers too far from the social norm (Stuntz, 2000).  
Hence, social constraints likely vary among countries 
and this diversity likely influences their perceived 
effectiveness. While legal contracts are enforced by a 
legal system, social norms are imposed by members of 
the particular community in which they are widely 
observed (Elster, 1989). Interestingly, obedience to 
social norms is often driven by the desire to avoid 
disapproval from the person’s professional or social 
group rather than by pure self-interest (Elster, 1989). 
Legal systems and social norms have arisen to address 
the persistent problem of opportunism—among many 
other issues. Thus, we predict that legal and social 
differences among nations impact a principal’s 
perceived effectiveness of legal and social constraints 
on agents. However, to comprehensively study such 
differences is difficult because legal codes change 
from country to country and social norms also can vary 
from group to group within a single country. 
Furthermore, these two factors interact to the extent 
that strong social norms (such as religious prohibitions 
against theft) can be embedded in legal systems, and 
laws can also change social norms (e.g., new laws 
requiring seatbelt use leading to a surge in “buckling 
up.”) Thus, a country’s legal systems and social norms 
often interact and coevolve. Hence, they jointly 
determine the effectiveness of constraints based on 
them. Their interplay and co-development make it 
extremely difficult to tease apart their independent 
effects; thus, we must look at their joint effect as a 
system designed, among other things, to constrain 
opportunism. 
P4: The joint effect of national differences in legal 
systems and social norms will influence a 
principal’s perceptions of the relative 
effectiveness of legal and social constraint 
mechanisms on agents. 
2.3.6 Summary 
With the continued growth in globalization, it is 
important to understand whether national differences 
exist concerning the effectiveness of opportunism 
constraints and, if they do, to interpret them. Such 
national variations would likely have important 
implications for firms operating across borders or for 
those serving clients with a multinational workforce. 
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3 Methodological Approach 
A mixed-method approach first leveraged a policy-
capturing approach to test the propositions; second, a 
qualitative inquiry provided further insight into the 
findings.  
3.1 Policy Capturing 
A policy-capturing study uses scenarios to discern 
individual decisions in response to a set of stimuli 
(Aiman-Smith et al., 2002) that are based on 
explanatory factors or cues (Karren & Barringer, 
2002). The methodology is designed to help 
understand and interpret a respondent’s policy-making 
process. Similar methodologies have been used in 
diverse fields, such as conjoint analysis or trade-off 
analysis in marketing (Cattin & Wittik, 1983; Green & 
Srinivasan, 1990), protocol analysis in information 
systems (Mackay, Barr, & Kletke, 1992), and 
contingent choice or analytical hierarchical process in 
social policy research (Mackenzie, 1993). Despite the 
differences in terminology, the techniques are largely 
similar (Aiman-Smith et al., 2002). In the IS field, 
policy capturing has been applied to computer training 
and software selection (Martocchio, Webster, & 
Baker, 1993). It is also has been used to reveal 
differences between Chinese and American managers 
with regard to compensation decisions (Zhou & 
Martocchio, 2001). Furthermore, in adopting policy 
capture as our research method, we respond to the call 
(Grover & Lyytinen, 2015) for a variety of IS research 
scripts and for new facets that, for example, mix theory 
with applicability.  
Policy-capturing studies allow for a relatively high 
degree of control and thus the ability to infer causal 
relationships. In order to explain findings, the 
researcher needs to ask subjects to respond to likely 
incidents rather than examining their actual responses 
to field problems (Karren & Barringer, 2002). 
Scenarios should be realistic and they should also 
cover the combination of explanatory factors—for 
example, through an experiment. In this way, 
researchers can rule out competing explanations and 
provide a reasonable degree of precision (Aiman-
Smith et al., 2002; McGrath, 1982). Scenario-based 
research is particularly effective when skilled judges 
are used (Banerjee, Cronan, & Jones, 1998; Biros, 
George, & Zmud, 2002; Sambamurthy & Zmud, 
1999), and it is appropriate when seeking causal rigor. 
The policy capturing method has several advantages. 
First, it indirectly assesses key explanatory variables 
via scenarios rather than asking subjects directly, such 
as rating key attributes. It is believed that the indirect 
approach reduces the overweighing of socially 
desirable factors. Also, scoring the individual 
attributes of a decision requires more insight than 
judging a multi-attribute scenario, and such scenarios 
can be constructed to be similar to actual decision 
problems. Second, the method enables the researcher 
to manipulate explanatory cues embedded in scenarios 
to improve internal validity. Third, while the unit of 
analysis is the individual, group-level analysis is also 
possible (Karren & Barringer, 2002). Fourth, policy 
capturing taps into the wisdom of the crowd and, in this 
case specifically, reveals the collective preference for 
particular constraints in given situations. These 
preferences, based on cumulative experience, can 
provide valuable insights for other practitioners facing 
similar situations for the first time. 
To reap the advantages of a policy-capturing study, the 
researcher must create realistic scenarios that include 
the desired explanatory factors, but also guard against 
presenting scenarios that are unrealistic (Karren & 
Barringer, 2002). For example, a combination of 
explanatory factors might result in an infeasible 
scenario, which should be removed from consideration 
even though the lack of a full factorial design will 
complicate subsequent statistical analysis. Finally, the 
researcher must avoid respondent overload, because of 
its potential impact on statistical power and reliability 
(Karren & Barringer, 2002). 
In the subsequent section, we first consider how to 
operationalize the explanatory factor before describing 
how we created realistic scenarios based on actual 
projects, tested that they stimulated the intended cues, 
and discarded one of the eight scenarios because of 
lack of realism. 
3.1.1 Operationalization of Constructs 
Three independent factors are used to explain the 
effectiveness of a constraint mechanism: the levels of 
explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge, and information 
asymmetry. As such, we rely on on prior definitions of 
tacit and explicit knowledge to operationalize these 
constructs, and on a related typology to identify IS 
consulting projects that have varying levels of 
information asymmetry.  
For each factor, we used a two-level predictor 
(high/low), for two reasons. First, our primary goal 
was to understand the importance of each attribute in 
predicting the perceived effectiveness of a constraint 
mechanism, and we determined that three two-level 
predictors provide sufficient insight. Second, the 
required number of scenarios increases substantially as 
the number of predictor levels rises and creates 
respondent fatigue. Theoretically, eight scenarios were 
identified, but during the pilot phase, we realized that 
one was infeasible from a practical sense (discussed 
later), so it was excluded from consideration. 
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Table 1. Constraint Mechanisms 
Constraint Type Definition Source 
Fixed-Price Contract (FP) Legal 




Time and Materials Contract 
(TM) 
Legal 




Purchase Order (PO) Legal 
A brief contract that specifies the product/service to be 
delivered and its cost. 
Dawson et al., 
2010 
Incentive Contracts (IC) Legal 
An addition to a contract that specifies a bonus for certain 
actions (e.g. faster delivery). 
Dawson et al., 
2010 
Advisor Firm (Third-Party 
Control) (AF) 
Social 
The hiring of another consulting firm to help oversee the 
consultant. 
Sharma, 1997 
Chain of Command (Bureaucratic 
Control) (CC) 
Social 
The use of the consultant’s chain of command within his/her 
consulting firm. 
Sharma, 1997 
Self-Control (SC) Social Reliance on a consultant’s personal ethics. Sharma, 1997 
Professional Reputation (Informal 
Community) (PR) 
Social 
Reliance on the lead consultant’s desire to maintain his/her 
public reputation for integrity and honesty. 
Dawson et al., 
2010 
We operationalized the constraint mechanisms using 
those in previous research (Dawson et al., 2010; see Table 
1), which we determined were common enough for 
respondents to be able to judge their relative 
effectiveness, resulting in eight dependent variables (one 
for each constraint mechanism). Thus, since respondents 
would be familiar with each constraint and able to judge 
its effectiveness, this ensured adequate realism of the 
study for potential respondents. We are aware that other 
constraints exist, though they are less used, and aver that 
these eight constraints provide sufficient insight and 
generality for the goals of this research.  
Negotiation of a consulting engagement is a multistep 
process through which a client becomes familiar with the 
consultant’s competencies and a consultant learns about 
the client’s project (Dawson et al., 2016). To avoid 
imprecision, we instructed each participant to assume that 
this was the first consulting engagement between a client 
and a consultant. We chose to focus on the initial stages 
of a business relationship when opportunism would 
appear to be most likely and of greatest concern to both 
parties. We acknowledge that if we assumed repeated and 
regular engagements between the client and the 
consultant, the results could be different.  
To test for national differences, we selected three 
countries (United States, China, and Saudi Arabia) that 
                                                          
11 While Saudi Arabian laws were originally entirely based 
on religion, they are now thought of as a combination of civil 
and religious law. 
12 According to the Pew Center on Religion, 73% of the US 
population self-identifies as Christian, 90% of the Chinese 
greatly differ in terms of legal system foundation 
(common, civil, and civil/religious law,11  respectively) 
and dominant religious or social influence (Christianity, 
Confucianism, and Islam, respectively).12 As such, these 
countries offer an  opportunity to evaluate the efficacy of 
various opportunism constraints across nations with both 
varying legal systems and social norm foundations.  
3.1.2 Scenario Development 
We based the scenarios on IS-related projects listed on the 
state of California’s Procurement Division’s website for 
active contracts. We identified projects with different 
levels of tacit and explicit knowledge and used several of 
these projects to create the scenarios. Because the 
procurement documents were lengthy (ranging from 50 
to 200 pages) and beyond what we could expect 
respondents to read, it was necessary to summarize them 
in three to four paragraphs. This use of actual projects as 
a foundation for the scenarios increases realism. We were 
not able to identify a procurement to meet one of the 
factor condition sets: high information asymmetry, low 
tacit knowledge, and low explicit knowledge. Thus, we 
were forced to create a scenario that met these conditions 
and matched the tone and level of detail of the other 
scenarios. 
population as Confucian and 96% of the Saudi population as 
Muslim. https://www.pewforum.org/search/?query=nationa 
l%20religion 
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Complex software development of a commercial-off-the-shelf 
(COTS) financial system 
High High High 
2 Assessment of disaster recovery readiness High Low High 
3 Greening of a data center High High Low 
4 
Development of a complex secure electronic communications and 
information processing network 
Low High High 
5 Developing and rolling out a new organizational structure Low Low High 
6 Data center equipment installation Low High Low 
7 Building microwave connectors Low Low Low 
The original scenarios were written and tested in English. 
A first pilot test was conducted with twelve IS 
consultants/clients that one of the paper’s authors knew 
from his past professional career as a senior executive in 
major IS consulting firms. The pilot served as a 
manipulation check to see if the respondents correctly 
associated each scenario with the explanatory factors 
associated with the intended levels of tacit knowledge, 
explicit knowledge, and information asymmetry. 
Subjects were given a definition and description of all 
three attributes and, for each scenario, they were asked to 
specify each factor’s level as low or high. In addition, 
respondents were asked to judge the level of realism of 
each scenario. The pilot revealed that in several scenarios 
the levels of tacit and explicit knowledge were not clear, 
and respondents did not consistently and correctly 
distinguish between levels of information asymmetry. 
However, all the respondents assessed the realism of the 
scenarios to be high—except for the fabricated scenario.  
The respondents stated that they could not envision a 
case where the information asymmetry favoring the 
consultant would be high (i.e., the client would be very 
unfamiliar with the project) while the level of tacit and 
explicit knowledge would be low (thus indicating a 
straightforward project). 
Upon reflection, we dropped this scenario in line with the 
realism guidelines for designing a policy-capturing 
study. Table 2 summarizes the attributes of the remaining 
seven scenarios. The pilots also indicated that our 
scenarios were unlikely to lead to respondent overload. 
After clarifying the seven scenarios to better distinguish 
the factors, the revised instrument was sent to eight new 
testers to judge the manipulation levels and to assess the 
realism of each scenario. This time, not only did all 
judges view the scenario realism as high, but of the 24 
total manipulations (eight testers each assessing all three 
manipulations), 22 fit the assigned level. The probability 
of getting 22 correct matches out of 24 under a binomial 
distribution assuming random selection (i.e., p = 0.5) is 
0.0001; thus, we concluded that the scenarios adequately 
captured the differences between high/low information 
asymmetry, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge. 
Two sample scenarios from the US version can be found 
in Appendix B. The survey was translated into Chinese 
using a double back-translation process. The seven 
scenarios were first translated into Chinese by two IS 
scholars proficient in Chinese and English who have 
studied and lived in an English-speaking country for 
more than one year.  
The original seven scenarios were extracted from the US 
context, which might mean that some aspects were not 
familiar or relevant to Chinese respondents. Minor and 
necessary adaptations were made. For example, in 
Scenario 2 the client firm was a major bridge builder in 
the state of California. In the Chinese version, this was 
revised to a major bridge builder in China. In Scenario 6, 
“Christmas” was changed to “Spring Festival,” and “60 
Minutes and the Wall Street Journal” was revised to 
“China Central Television and national major journals.” 
Other than these few changes, all key facts were 
consistent across both versions. Then we asked a 
language expert who was unfamiliar with the research 
content to translate the Chinese version back into 
English. We sent the back-translation to the authors of 
the original questionnaire to make sure that the 
translation was accurate, the changes were suitable, and 
meaning was not distorted by the translation process. 
Following their comments and feedback, another round 
of minor revision was done, and then we refined the 
translation of the English instrument into its final 
Chinese version. 
We conducted a pilot test with eight MBA students at a 
Chinese university who were clients of IS consultants. 
We gave them an introduction of the definition and 
described the three attributes. The purpose was to ensure 
that the respondents understood the linkage between 
each scenario and the underlying levels of tacit 
knowledge, explicit knowledge, and information 
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asymmetry. The manipulation verification was repeated 
successfully in China with the result that 21 of the 24 
manipulations matched (p = .001). 
Because English is the dominant business language in 
Saudi Arabia, we did not translate the scenarios, but 
slightly modified them to reflect national differences. For 
example, in our second scenario, we changed the location 
of the bridge builder to the “Eastern Province of Saudi 
Arabia.” Because the changes were minor, we did not 
conduct any additional manipulation checks.  
3.1.3 Data Collection United States 
Data collection was first conducted in the US between 
January and May 2011. The instrument was sent to 240 
experienced client IS project managers who were part of 
the first author’s LinkedIn contacts. In keeping with the 
policy-capturing protocol (Aiman-Smith et al., 2002), we 
sent an introductory message that described the purpose 
and process of the research without revealing the 
propositions. Since all the respondents were experienced 
in managing IS consultants, they were simply directed to 
answer questions based on their experience. We also 
described the source of information for the scenarios, 
since doing so could increase the respondents’ 
perceptions of realism and rigor (Aiman-Smith et al., 
2002). 
We asked each respondent to judge the effectiveness of 
each of the eight constraints (see Table 2). We 
specifically did not ask them which constraint(s) they 
generally used; rather, we had them focus on how 
effective each constraint would be for a specified 
scenario. As such, our research was designed to be 
normative rather than descriptive. Further, this ensured 
that respondents were not unduly bound by the practices 
of their employer. 
Using one legal constraint obviates the ability to use 
another legal constraint for the same engagement and this 
differs from social constraints where multiple constraints 
might be used for the same engagement. Thus, 
respondents were asked to assess the effectiveness of 
each constraint individually. A total of 50 people 
(20.8%) fully completed the survey.  
3.1.4 Data Collection: China 
A survey was conducted in China from May to July 
2012. The target respondents were IS client project 
managers dealing with IS consultants. We collected data 
in two ways. First, we solicited contacts from MBA 
students of a full-time MBA program at a major Chinese 
university. Based on the contacts provided by the 
students, we sent 50 questionnaires to IS client project 
managers and received 33 valid questionnaires, which 
translates into a response rate of 66%. Second, we sent 
25 questionnaires to IS client project managers that one 
of the paper’s authors knew from her past industry career 
experience, and we received 21 valid responses—a 
response rate of 84%. In total, we sent out 75 
questionnaires and received 54 valid returns, thus leading 
to a response rate of 72%.  
3.1.5 Data Collection: Saudi Arabia 
It is a formidable undertaking to collect primary research 
data in Saudi Arabia. Directories that can serve as 
sampling frames for representative samples do not exist. 
For this study, we collected data from four different 
sources: a prestigious university’s alumni, EMBA 
participants, personal contacts, and two large companies. 
The data collection took place from January to May 
2014. We sent invitation letters, via email, to 191 people 
identified as IS managers or IS project managers who 
had worked with IS consultants. The invitation letters 
described the purpose of the research and assured 
confidentiality of individual responses. Of the 191 
invitations, 63 accepted. Of these, after two reminders, 
48 responses were received. All responses were 
complete and valid, yielding a response rate of 25%, 
based on the original 191 invitations.  
3.1.6 Data Analysis 
Respondents were provided with eight feasible 
constraint mechanisms: four legal and four social. At first 
glance, it might be tempting to think of the four legal and 
the four social constraint options as formative items 
measuring legal and social constructs, respectively. 
However, this is not the case. First, each of the 
constraints is a construct (e.g., a purchase order), and 
second, they are options. A firm could select only one 
legal constraint. It could select one or more social 
constraints, but each has a cost. For example, using an 
advisor firm is quite costly, relative to relying on 
professional reputation. Consequently, it is not 
appropriate to test a conventional casual model because 
the implicit assumptions are violated. In addition to 
gathering data on the perceived effectiveness of 
constraint mechanisms, we also captured data on two 
covariates—work experience and perception of 
consultant honesty—that could potentially contribute to 
explaining a respondent’s choice of constraint 
mechanism. 
Respondents with more years of experience working 
with consultants should have deeper insights on the 
effectiveness of various constraints. Learning, however, 
typically follows a power curve (Ritter & Schooler, 
2001), with most learning occurring in the early years 
and less later. Thus, in the analysis, we used a log 
transformation of this covariate. Additionally, a 
respondent’s perception of consultant honesty might also 
influence the choice of constraints. The data from three 
rounds of data collection were merged into a single file 
(Table 3). Statistical measures of each of the variables 
and their correlations are available in Appendix C. 
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Table 3. Data Set Structure 
Variable Name Type Values 
Subject identifier SUB Integer 
China (n=54), Saudi Arabia 
(n=48), US (n=50) 
Nation NAT Categorical  China, Saudi Arabia, or US 
Years of experience working 
with consultants 
EXP Continuous 0-40 
Perception of consultant 
honesty 
HON Continuous  29.5-87.5 
Scenario SEN Categorical 1-7 
Information asymmetry IA Categorical Low or high 
Explicit knowledge EK Categorical Low or high 
Implicit knowledge TK Categorical Low or high 
Constraint effectiveness 
FP, TM, PO, IC, AF, 
CC, SC, and PR 
Scale 1-5  
Table 4. Years of Experience with Consultants (Mean, Difference, and Significance) 
 Saudi Arabia (9.21) US (12.62) 
China (3.27) 5.93 9.35 
Saudi Arabia (9.21)  3.41 
Notes: Shaded cells are significantly different. This study’s threshold for significance tests is 5%, with appropriated 
correction, such as Tukey’s HSD, for multiple unplanned comparisons. 
Table 5. Honesty of Consultants (Mean, Difference, and Significance) 
 Saudi Arabia (56.82) US (63.41) 
China (67.88) -11.07 -4.47 
Saudi Arabia (56.82)  6.59 
Note: Shaded cells are significantly different 
Table 6. MANOVA results 
Term p 
IA < .0001 * 
EK 0.0746 
TK 0.0021 * 
log(experience) < .0001 * 
honesty 0.0021 * 
IA:EK 0.0020 * 
IA:TK 0.0064 * 
EK:TK 0.0003 * 
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Table 7. General Linear Model Analysis Showing P-Values for Significant Variables and R2 
Constraint IA EK TK IA*EK IA*TK EK*TK Log 
(EXP) 
HON NAT R2m R2c 
FP   .0396     .0042 .0031 .04 .26 
TM < .0001  .0388 .0111  .0053    .07 .23 
PO   .0001    .0076  < .0001 .11 .39 
IC  .0288  .0002 .0020 .0002  .0283  .05 .26 
AF < .0001  .0036 .0035 .0156 .0177  .0094  .14 .35 
CC         < .0001 .04 .32 
SC       .0187   .03 .38 
PR .0013 .0116 .0050   < .0001   .0361 .08 .34 
3.1.7 Covariates (Control) Variables 
An analysis of the covariates shows that Chinese 
respondents have significantly less experience working 
with consultants than those of Saudi Arabia and the US 
(Table 4). Chinese and US respondents, compared to 
those in Saudi Arabia, perceive a higher level of 
consultant honesty (Table 5). There is no significant 
correlation between log(EXP) and HON at the overall or 
national level. 
3.1.8 General Linear Model Analysis 
We used a variety of R packages for the analysis. We 
started with MANOVA to test the overall model using 
stats::lm.13 
 (FP, TM, PO, IC, AF, CC, SC, PR) = IA + EK + TK 
+ IA*EK + IA*TK + EK*TK + log(EXP) + HON + 
NAT + (1 | SUB) 
Because the scenarios (based on IA, EK, and TK) are 
the manipulation, we examined interaction effects 
(e.g., IA*EK). As there are seven observations for each 
respondent, we specified nesting within subjects (i.e., 
1 | SUB). However, the solution could not be computed 
because of a computational singularity. By removing 
the random effect (1 | SUB), we could compute a 
MANOVA (Table 6). As the purpose of MANOVA is 
to give a measure of overall model fit, this is a 
reasonable response to the singularity problem. All 
terms are significant except for EK, which has 
significant interaction with IA and TK. 
Given a significant MANOVA, we then used 
lme4::lmer to fit the general linear model for each 
constraint: 
constraint = IA + EK + TK + IA*EK + IA*TK + 
EK*TK + log(EXP) + HON + NAT + (1 | SUB) 
                                                          
13 Indicates R package and method.. 
We used car: Anova to compute p-values and MuMin: 
r.squaredGLMM to compute R-squared measures. 
For mixed-effects models, R² can be categorized into: 
marginal R2, which represents the variance explained 
by fixed factors; and conditional R², the variance 
explained by both fixed and random factors (i.e., the 
entire model). We tested the theoretical model eight 
times, once for each of the possible constraints (Table 
7).  
Inspection of Table 7 indicates that: 
• The theoretical model contributes in varying 
ways to explaining the effectiveness of each of 
the legal constraints, but it contributes to 
explaining only two of the social constraints, 
where the significance of the results is 
attributable to national differences and client 
experience with consultants.  
• Of the manipulated variables, tacit knowledge is 
a direct or interaction effect explaining 
effectiveness for six constraints. 
• Information asymmetry, the “root cause” of 
opportunism, is a main effect for three 
constraints and an interaction effect for one.  
• The lack of main effects for CC and SC could 
be because these constraints are rarely used, and 
thus clients have little evidence for making an 
informed evaluation of their effectiveness. This 
conjecture is supported by subsequent analysis 
(Table 19). 
• Nation is a significant factor for four of the 
constraints, two each of legal and social. 
• Consulting experience and perceived consulting 
honesty contribute to explaining the 
effectiveness of five constraints. 
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• The percentage of variance explained by fixed 
and random factors ranges from 23% to 39%. 
The findings show that a combination of information 
asymmetry and type of knowledge generally explain a 
constraint’s effectiveness when you look at the results 
collectively via MANOVA and with separate 
ANOVAs, but not all factors have significance for the 
effectiveness of a particular constraint. In other words, 
there is evidence of the theoretical model holding in 
the general sense and partially in specific cases.  
To gain a deeper understanding of the ANOVA results, 
we used contrast analysis. First, Hotelling’s 
multivariate T-test (Hotelling, 1931) is used to 
compare sets of means (e.g., perceived effectiveness of 
constraints under high and low asymmetry). Second, if 
a difference is detected, univariate tests of the 
individual means are conducted to identify the source 
of the difference. Because these involve multiple t-
tests for the same hypothesis, we make a Bonferroni 
correction (Dunn, 1961) based on the number of means 
compared. For example, if we conduct eight univariate 
tests, the adjusted p-value is .00625 (.05/8).  
Recall that a client can select only one of four possible 
legal constraints, and could opt for one or more social 
constraints, but also wants to minimize the cost of 
invoking such constraints. Thus, we examine whether 
a client prefers one type of constraint over another 
(e.g., social over legal) for a given situation. We apply 
a two-step process. First, we compute the mean 
effectiveness score of each constraint and then sort 
these in descending order to identify the relative 
arithmetic preferences. As it might be the case that one 
or more of one type of constraints ranks higher than the 
other, as a second step we do a t-test on the highest 
legal versus highest social constraint to determine if 
there is a significant preference for one type of 
constraint.  
When four constraints of one type are all numerically 
preferred over the four constraints of the other type, the 
probability of such an occurrence is 0.0143,14 and we 
conclude that such a situation indicates significance 
preference for all constraints of one class over the 
other. 
3.2 Qualitative Inquiry 
In addition to this policy-capturing approach, we 
pursued a qualitative inquiry to make additional sense 
of our findings. Specifically, we conducted 24 
interviews (10, 7, and 7 with respondents in China, 
Saudi Arabia, and the US, respectively) to obtain a 
richer, more detailed understanding of how 
opportunism was construed and constrained among 
client firms from these nations. These interviews were 
                                                          
14 (4/8)*(3/7)* (2/6)*(1/5) 
semistructured, in that we only had a few seed 
questions that encouraged respondents to divulge as 
much as they wanted on the subject. Specifically, we 
asked respondents to provide examples of consultant 
opportunism, to comment on the frequency of such 
events, and to discuss the usefulness of contracts and 
other approaches to constrain opportunism. These 
interviews were coded to facilitate cross-referencing 
with the results from the policy capturing approach.  
4 Hypothesis Testing 
A hypothesis is one of several operationalizations of a 
proposition because it translates concepts into context 
and variables. Thus, we discuss the results15 in terms 
of hypotheses about clients (principals) and 
consultants (agents) to reflect the context of this study. 
We report on four situations for each hypothesis, which 
comprise the findings for the combined data from the 
three nations, and the results for each nation 
individually. We implicitly test Hypothesis 4 as part of 
the test of Hypotheses 1-3. At times, we also indicate 
what was additionally learned from the interviews. 
H1a: A client will perceive that the effectiveness of 
both legal and social constraints on consultants 
decreases as information asymmetry favoring 
consultants increases. 
Across all constraints and countries, we found that 
constraint effectiveness varies based on the level of 
information asymmetry (see Table 8).  
H1b: When information asymmetry favoring 
consultants is low, a client will perceive legal 
constraints as relatively more effective than 
social constraints. 
Overall, and in China and Saudi Arabia specifically, 
we found support for the preceding hypothesis (Table 
9). Overall, and in China specifically, the preferred 
legal constraint when information asymmetry (IA) is 
low is a time and materials contract, while in Saudi 
Arabia, it is a fixed price contract. US respondents did 
not prefer legal over social constraints. Our post hoc 
interviews also indicate that US principals, in general, 
do not consider legal constraints to be superior to social 
constraints. One interviewee commented that “a 
contract is not on the mind of consultants who are 
looking to benefit themselves,” thus minimizing its 
value in constraining opportunism. Another US 
respondent acknowledged that, in the context of IS 
consulting, “there are significantly lower barriers to 
terminating the relationship,” such that the ability to 
end a consulting relationship was a strong enough 
deterrent, regardless of how detailed the legal contract 
was. No respondents mentioned that quick termination 
15 Nonsignificant results are not detailed. 
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was a common, accepted practice in China or Saudi 
Arabia. 
This contrasts with the Chinese and Saudi 
interviewees, who invoked the need for better contracts 
in many situations involving opportunism. For 
example, when asked about the type of opportunistic 
incidents they had encountered, these respondents 
described circumstances that could have been 
prevented by tighter contracts—for example, 
consultants stealing a software solution, implementing 
a solution that failed to scale, sending inexperienced 
coders, scope creep, or inconsistent prices. Concerning 
the most effective measures for limiting opportunism, 
a Chinese respondent, like many others, alluded to 
better, stricter, contracts: “The contract [should] 
stipulate the knowledge, technology and experience of 
consultants… these should be quantified and agreed in 
quantitative details.” Saudis appear to agree: “A well 
written contract that covers details and penalties on 
both sides should really be sufficient to guarantee fair 
collaboration.” Thus, and regardless of the extent of 
information asymmetry, the US versus Chinese and 
Saudi respondents think differently about the 
effectiveness of social and legal constraints.  
H1c: When information asymmetry favoring 
consultants is high, a client will perceive social 
constraints to be relatively more effective than 
legal constraints. 
This hypothesis was supported overall and in the US, 
but not in China or Saudi Arabia (Table 10). 
Additionally, for the US, the first four preferred 
constraints are all social constraints. The qualitative 
interviews also support the extent to which US 
respondents believe in the power of social constraints 
over legal ones, again regardless of the extent of 
information asymmetry.  
Table 8. H1a (Low IA Mean vs. High IA Mean) 
Overall China Saudi Arabia US 
p < .0001 p < .0001 p < .0001 p < .0001 
 
Table 9. H1b (Low IA Favors Legal Constraints) 
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The need for both preventive controls (such as 
blocking personal websites on company laptops, 
requiring on-site work, and aligning incentives) and 
detective controls (such as monitoring of network 
activity) were acknowledged as more effective than 
contracts. Many US respondents emphasized how the 
element of trust was essential to a positive consulting 
engagement, highlighting the extent to which 
consultants needed to be vetted prior to the 
engagement. One US respondent explained how his 
company developed a systematic way of doing this: 
“My company has a codified process for hiring 
consultants onto big projects that is a sort of 
background check. You need to know the consultant’s 
past performance.” With this knowledge in hand, the 
need to have a bulletproof contract is diminished. In 
summary, considering both H1a and H1b, it appears 
that regardless of the extent of information asymmetry, 
US respondents perceive social constraints as more 
effective than legal ones. 
H2a: A client will perceive that the effectiveness of 
legal constraints on consultants decreases as the 
level of explicit knowledge increases. 
This hypothesis is not supported at any level (Table 
11). The effectiveness of constraints is not perceived 
as sensitive to changes at the level of explicit 
knowledge.  
H2b: A client will perceive the effectiveness of social 
constraints on consultants to be independent of 
the level of explicit knowledge.  
Overall, and for each country, respondents support the 
hypothesis (Table 12). In all cases, the level of explicit 
knowledge does not have an impact on perceptions of 
how effective social constraints are. 
H2c: When explicit knowledge is low, a client will 
perceive legal constraints on consultants to be 
relatively more effective than social constraints. 
The above hypothesis is significant only for the US 
(Table 13) and is the opposite of the suggested 
direction. The preference is for social over legal 
constraints. 
H2d: When explicit knowledge is high, a client will 
perceive social constraints to be relatively more 
effective on consultants than legal constraints. 
There is support for this hypothesis in the US, where 
professional reputation is perceived as the most 
effective constraint. China, however, shows a 
preference for all legal constraints over any of the 
social constraints (Table 14).  
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Table 11. H2a (Low EK Mean vs. High EK Mean for Legal Constraints) 
Overall China Saudi Arabia US 
p =.34 p = .91 p = .64 p = .06 
 
Table 12. H2b (Low EK Mean vs. High EK Mean for Social Constraints) 
Overall China Saudi Arabia US 
p = .28 p = .21 p = .74 p = .62 
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Table 13. H2c (Preference for Legal Constraints when EK Is Low) 
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p = .0001 
Note: Highest scoring legal and social constraints are in bold. 
Table 14. H2d (Preference for Social Constraints when EK Is High) 
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Again, our qualitative interviews support the findings of 
both H2c and H2d. When asked about the type of 
opportunistic incidents they had witnessed, US 
respondents often pointed to situations that could not 
have been anticipated and explicitly covered within the 
boundaries of legal contracts, thus diminishing their 
effectiveness. For example, we were told that US 
consultants often blurred the line between what is 
required and what is considered best practice in the hope 
of being hired to perform additional work. Creating 
ambiguity of that sort is particularly easy where there is 
little explicit knowledge involved. In the same vein, 
some consultants were known to exaggerate the quality 
of the work they had delivered in the past, so as to 
increase the likelihood of being selected for a given 
engagement. According to one US respondent 
“Consultants frequently embellish their assessment 
results in order to sell more work”. Even in engagements 
with high required explicit knowledge, US respondents 
alluded to consultant opportunism that simply could not 
be constrained via contracts. This seems to be 
particularly the case when consultants were from small 
firms. A US respondent shared such an incident with us: 
“A contractor from a small business who was solely 
responsible for highly technical work on a 
mainframe…. He worked independently while onsite 
(his supervisor was in another city). Since he had limited 
to no interaction with the rest of the team, and his desk 
was literally behind a pole and around a corner, no one 
paid much attention when he stopped showing up to 
work”.  
 
Table 15. H3a (Low TK Mean vs. High TK Mean for Legal Constraints) 
Overall China Saudi Arabia US 
p < .0001 p  = .02 p = .13 p = .003 
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Table 16. H3b (Preference for Legal when TK Is Low) 
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Eventually, in order to minimize this problem, this 
respondent’s firm implemented greater oversight and 
closer supervision as normal procedures while dealing 
with consultants from small firms. 16 All in all, with 
or without much explicit knowledge, U.S. respondents 
considered social constraints as generally more 
effective. 
H3a: A client will perceive that the effectiveness of 
legal constraints on consultants is reduced in 
contexts of higher tacit knowledge. 
There is support for H3a, both overall and in two of the 
three countries (see Table 15) 
H3b: When tacit knowledge is low, a client will 
perceive legal constraints on consultants to be 
relatively more effective than social constraints. 
Overall, and specifically in China and Saudi Arabia, 
we found support for this hypothesis (Table 16). 
Specifically, in these cases, the fixed price contract 
was perceived as more effective than all other legal and 
social constraints. However, the US respondents had a 
                                                          
16 In the US, federal agencies are often required to hire small 
businesses for a certain percentage of their consulting 
engagements.   
different perception, and there was no significant 
difference between the highest rated legal and social 
constraints. 
H3c: When tacit knowledge is high, a client will 
perceive social constraints on consultants to be 
relatively more effective than legal constraints. 
We found support for this hypothesis overall and in the 
US but not in China or Saudi Arabia (Table 17). In fact, 
for the US, the highest rated constraints were all social. 
H3a, H3b, and H3c highlight the US respondents’ 
inclination to value social mechanisms to constrain 
opportunism, regardless of the amount of tacit 
knowledge involved in a given engagement. Again, 
our qualitative interviews support this finding. For 
example, a US respondent shared a story involving a 
consultant hired for work requiring low tacit 
knowledge:  
 [The consultants] were unable to 
successfully roll out a procure-to-pay 
platform along a previously agreed-upon 
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timeline.… [They] positioned themselves as 
having no culpability in the delay and 
proceeded to sell follow-on work to our 
executive team with a smaller, higher-
margin team to cover the extended timeline.  
The respondent explained how, in this situation, trust 
had been breached, and that was going to prevent this 
consultant from ever be hired again: “This integration 
partner is unlikely to receive the opportunity to bid on 
future work and traded a short-term win for the longer-
term relationship.” 
In the same vein, even when tacit knowledge is high, 
US respondents also pointed out the ineffectiveness of 
legal contracts—as illustrated by the following:  
Because the deliverables were vague with 
no clear deadlines, he [the consultant] 
continued to drag out his work but 
continued to bill the client. Eventually, the 
client asked for him to provide his 
deliverables in draft form to review the 
work completed to date. He turned over a 
single incomplete spreadsheet for which he 
had billed more than four months of time.  
This respondent went on to explain that social 
constraints, not better contracts, were the way to 
control such situations. Our qualitative data thus 
further support the US respondents’ preference for 
social constraints, regardless of the extent of tacit 
knowledge.  
H4: The joint effect of national differences in legal 
systems and social norms will influence a client’s 
perceptions of the relative effectiveness of legal 
and social constraint mechanisms on consultants. 
A review of the national difference findings for 
Hypotheses 1-3 supports Hypothesis 4. For 8 of the 10 
hypotheses for which significance was detected, there 
were significant moderating effects on the level of 
nation (Table 18). For H1a, there was no moderating 
effect in terms of the perceived decreasing 
effectiveness of constraints as information asymmetry 
increases. Since we found national differences across 
7 of the 9 other hypotheses, we conclude that national 
differences in legal systems and social norms moderate 
the perceived relative effectiveness of constraint 
mechanisms, supporting the conceptual model (Figure 
1) presented earlier. An additional goal was to gain 
some insight into which constraints work under certain 
circumstances, as such knowledge has practical 
implications. Consequently, we analyzed each of the 
scenarios according to nation (Table 19). 
 
Table 17. H3c (Preference for Social when TK Is High) 










Advisor Firm  
Fixed Price 
Chain of Command 
Self-Control 
Incentive Contract 




















Chain Of Command 
Self-Control 
Advisor Firm   
Fixed Price 
Incentive Contract 










p < .001 
Note: first four 
constraints are all 
social 




Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
 
1007 
Table 18. Summary of H1-H3 
Hypothesis Summary of findings Nation moderator effect? 
H1a Overall significance and for each country  N 
H1b Overall significance and for China and Saudi Arabia, 
but not for the US 
Y 
H1c Overall significance, but significant only for the US Y 
H2a Not significant overall or for any country N 
H2b Not significant for any country N 
H2c Significant for the US Y 
H2d Significant only for China and the US Y 
H3a Overall significance and for China and US, but not for 
Saudi Arabia. 
Y 
H3b Overall significance, but not significant for the US Y 
H3c Overall significance, but significant only for the US Y 
We now dissect these results to identify those scenarios 
where we can ascertain an overall preference for a 
specific constraint for each combination of information 
asymmetry and knowledge type. For the reader’s 
convenience, in the text we identify each scenario in a 
concise form (e.g., IA-H, EK-H, TK-H). Where 
appropriate, we report a p-value based on a binomial 
distribution assuming each constraint has an equal 
chance of selection.  
If three out of three nations have the same constraint 
with the numerically highest value, then p = .0002, and 
similarly for two out of three, p = .04. We report both 
such occurrences as significant. For the most complex 
engagement (IA-H, EK-H, TK-H), there is a significant 
preference (p = .0002) for using an advisor firm by all 
three nations and, collectively, they consider using an 
advisor firm as more effective than all forms of 
contracts. This is not surprising; because all factors are 
high, the client faces a triple disadvantage and needs the 
help of a domain expert to monitor the consultant. As 
the combined results indicate, a contract in any form is 
a less effective constraint. In this scenario, nation has 
little impact, though the Chinese preference for a 
purchase order is somewhat discordant. In comparison, 
for less complex engagements (IA-L, EK-L, TK-L and 
IA-L, EK-H, TK-L), in every case using an advisor firm 
is considered inferior to some form of contract. Again, 
not surprising, as using an advisor firm is a costly 
constraint and unlikely to be used when the client has a 
major information asymmetry disadvantage.  
For what might be judged the second most complex 
engagement (IA-H, EK-L, TK-H), China and Saudi 
Arabia agree (p = .04) on the effectiveness of using an 
advisor firm, but individually see no difference across 
the various constraints. The US prefers public reputation 
over all forms of a contract. In another difficult scenario 
for the client (IA-H, EK-H, TK-L), Saudi Arabia and the 
US agree on the superior effectiveness of using an 
advisor firm  (p = .04). However, individually China and 
Saudi Arabia see no differences across the various 
constraints, and the US reports two forms of legal 
contract (FP and IC) as being equally effective. 
The most difficult situation to interpret is IA-L, EK-L, 
TK-H, which seems to be an outlier to an overall pattern 
of greater reliance on contracts when information 
asymmetry is low. In this case, there is agreement on the 
value of public reputation as the key constraint, though 
individually China and Saudi Arabia perceive no 
differences among the option, whereas the US sees 
public reputation as superior to all types of contracts. In 
comparison, for IA-L, EK-H, TK-H, which would seem 
to be more problematic to monitor, there is no clear 
reliance on public reputation. These differences might 
be a result of the scenarios used for IA-L, EK-L, TK-H 
rather than reflective of the overall pattern. 
Collectively, an examination of the effectiveness of the 
various constraints shows that when information 
asymmetry is high, respondents prefer social constraints 
and when it is low they turn to legal constraints, as 
revealed by hypothesis testing at the manipulation level 
and the scenario analysis. The major national difference 
is that the US shows a stronger preference for social 
versus legal constraints than China and Saudi Arabia, 
which is corroborated by our qualitative interviews.
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Table 19. Analysis of Scenarios by Nation 
Scenario Nation Constraint 
IA EK TK  Legal Social 
    FP TM PO IC AF CC SC PR 
H H H All 3.32 3.05 3.09 3.48 3.88 3.31 3.27 3.61 
   China 3.31 3.43 3.69 3.43 3.69 3.07 3.24 3.35 
   Saudi Arabia 3.48 2.90 3.04 3.38 4.00 3.35 3.04 3.58 
   US 3.18 2.80 2.50 3.64 3.96 3.52 3.52 3.92 
H L H All 3.55 3.20 3.21 3.24 3.82 3.51 3.50 3.91 
   China 3.39 3.39 3.61 3.63 3.89 3.55 3.70 3.83 
   Saudi Arabia 3.69 3.21 3.19 3.08 3.71 3.38 3.23 3.69 
   US 3.58 2.98 2.77 2.96 3.85 3.60 3.54 4.23 
H H L All 3.63 3.23 3.42 3.46 3.54 3.34 3.34 3.74 
   China 3.58 3.51 3.72 3.58 3.51 3.26 3.40 3.47 
   Saudi Arabia 3.62 3.15 3.27 3.31 3.77 3.35 3.19 3.79 
   US 3.69 3.02 3.23 3.48 3.33 3.40 3.42 4.00 
L H H All 3.38 3.67 3.33 3.21 2.91 3.33 3.34 3.47 
   China 3.53 3.60 3.64 3.36 3.30 3.17 3.36 3.42 
   Saudi Arabia 3.50 3.81 3.40 3.06 2.65 3.33 3.06 3.42 
   US 3.12 3.60 2.94 3.20 2.76 3.50 3.58 3.58 
L L H All 3.50 3.43 3.25 3.45 3.26 3.53 3.42 3.87 
   China 3.40 3.55 3.47 3.55 3.38 3.32 3.38 3.70 
   Saudi Arabia 3.73 3.29 3.49 3.33 3.15 3.50 3.30 3.73 
   US 3.39 3.43 2.78 3.45 3.24 3.78 3.59 4.20 
L H L All 3.67 3.63 3.43 3.72 2.85 3.38 3.38 3.41 
   China 3.81 3.87 3.69 3.89 3.07 3.30 3.37 3.31 
   Saudi Arabia 3.81 3.48 3.62 3.27 2.62 3.29 3.31 3.40 
   US 3.38 3.52 2.96 3.96 2.82 3.56 3.44 3.52 
L L L All 3.59 3.72 3.60 3.32 2.83 3.33 3.19 3.17 
   China 3.89 3.76 3.74 3.33 3.00 3.26 3.20 3.20 
   Saudi Arabia 3.73 3.81 3.81 3.40 2.79 3.40 3.21 3.12 
   US 3.12 3.57 3.22 3.24 2.67 3.35 3.16 3.16 
Notes: Bold: numerically largest mean for each row.  
Italics and red: significantly smaller from the numerically largest mean based on Tukey’s HSD. 
5 Discussion 
We now provide a synthesis of the prior detailed data 
analysis by considering the collective composition of 
constraints, national differences, and individual 
factors. A theoretical model is often a broad brush used 
to explain a phenomenon in general by including 
factors that might contribute to the outcome. 
Somewhat like a person’s gene, some variables might 
not “be expressed” (i.e., not statistically significant) 
unless certain environmental conditions apply. Thus, 
under some variations of the environment (mixes of 
IA, EK, and TK), some constraints might not be 
effective, or they could be ineffective under all 
circumstances. The preceding analysis suggests that 
chain of command (CC) and self-control (SC) are 
ineffective under all conditions examined (Table 7 and 
Table 19), whereas all other types of constraint are 
identified as being effective in some situations and not 
others. 
When information asymmetry and tacit knowledge are 
low, legal constraints are perceived as more effective, 
but no clear preference emerges when we analyze the 
data from a scenario perspective (Table 19). When tacit 
knowledge considered alone is high (Table 17), 
professional reputation is considered most effective, 
but when viewed in the scenario context (Table 19), the 
findings are anomalous, as mentioned previously, for 
IA-L, EK-H, TK-H. The clear lesson that emerges is 
that legal constraints are judged as an inferior choice 
when information asymmetry is high. 
The findings suggest that explicit knowledge is a less 
important determinant of constraint choice than 
information asymmetry or tacit knowledge, and that 
the effectiveness of social constraints is independent of 
the level of explicit knowledge (H2b). Only the US 
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respondents reported that (1) the effectiveness of legal 
constraints decreases as the level of explicit knowledge 
increases (H2c), and (2) that when explicit knowledge 
is high, social constraints are relatively more effective 
than legal constraints (H2d). This is perhaps because 
the connection to information asymmetry, the root 
cause of opportunism, is much stronger for tacit 
knowledge, which is derived from judgment, expertise, 
and experience. Tacit knowledge is not as readily 
attainable in terms of both time and effort as explicit 
knowledge. While one can attend a class or read a book 
to build explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge 
acquisition is often time-consuming and can even be 
somewhat serendipitous. It might be developed by 
exposure to a set of unusual circumstance or problems, 
wide experiences in many settings, or extended 
mentoring in an aggressive learning environment. It is 
primarily tacit knowledge that makes consultants 
valuable and constitutes the reason to hire them. 
However, it also creates information asymmetry. Our 
findings suggest that for IS consulting, required tacit 
knowledge determines information asymmetry.  
National differences (see Table 7 and Table 18) clearly 
influence the effectiveness of constraints. The US was 
different on 6 of the 10 hypotheses, and US 
respondents had a stronger preference for social 
constraints as compared to the other two nations. China 
and Saudi Arabia had similar views on the higher 
effectiveness of legal versus social constraints.  
The direct cost of the US tort system (under which 
contractual issues are resolved) is USD 250 billion, 
which is 2% of the US GDP and is double the estimated 
tort expenses in other countries (Post, 2011). 
According to John Beisner, a partner at the US law firm 
of Skadden: 
America’s litigious nature has caused 
serious damage to our country’s 
productivity and innovation. … The root 
cause is that we have created incentives to 
sue—and to invest in litigation—instead of 
establishing disincentives for invoking 
judicial process unless absolutely 
necessary. Other countries discourage 
litigation; we nurture it. (Post, 2011, p. 1).  
In 2011, the US Congress proposed the Lawsuit Abuse 
Reduction Act (LARA), which was designed to provide 
sanctions against parties that file unwarranted or 
harassing claims. The bill eventually passed in 2015, 
and its presence reflects a prevailing belief that the US 
legal system is costly and not as effective as it should 
be. As a result, clients in the US might see social 
constraints as a less costly and less protracted 
mechanism for curtailing opportunism than their 
counterparts in China and Saudi Arabia. 
China and Saudi Arabia have similar views on the 
higher effectiveness of legal versus social constraints, 
despite some criticisms of the corruption present in 
Chinese courts (Chin & Areddy, 2014) and difficulties 
resulting from the religious underpinnings of the Saudi 
courts (Usa, 2007). While the overall views of Chinese 
and Saudi respondents were fairly similar with regards 
to a preference for legal constraints, we suspect that the 
underlying causes might be dissimilar, due to the 
make-up of the consulting industry in each country. In 
Saudi Arabia, consulting firms are generally from 
outside the country and will often fly in professionals 
from Europe or the US to perform the work. Hence, 
Saudi clients may feel far more comfortable with legal 
remedies to manage these non-Saudi professionals, 
who are unlikely to share the social embeddedness of 
their Saudi clients. 
In China, however, the large consulting market has 
many firms that hire almost exclusively Chinese 
consultants. Thus, this suggests that social constraints 
could constrain opportunism. However, the consulting 
industry in China is relatively new, as compared to the 
market in the US, with many marking 2001, when 
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), as 
the point at which IS consulting started to escalate in 
China. For example, prior to China joining the WTO, 
the largest Chinese IS outsourcing firm had about 200 
employees. Currently, several of the largest firms have 
over one million employees (Lingnian, 2012), which 
represents a phenomenal growth rate in just over a 
decade. We posit that the lack of appreciation for social 
constraints among Chinese firms may simply reflect 
the immaturity of the market, the phenomenon of rapid 
growth inhibiting the development of social 
relationships, and perhaps a lack of awareness of the 
value of social constraints. If this conjecture is correct, 
we expect that social constraints will become 
increasingly applicable in China as the market matures. 
Clearly, future research will need to more closely 
examine this explanation.  
Another possible explanation might be that China’s 
economy has developed very quickly in the last two 
decades with rapid social changes at the same time. 
The influence of old social norms has decreased while 
new social norms are not yet fully developed. 
Corruption during this fast development period has 
been perceived as high, and anticorruption campaigns 
have been a key issue during the past several years. 
Accordingly, Chinese clients might not view social 
norms as an effective means of constraining 
opportunism. 
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Figure 2. Revised Conceptual Model 
These results provide evidence that, as we suggested in 
Figure 1, TRC needs to be modified to accommodate 
national differences. Based on our data, we found 
evidence of national differences that, among other 
factors, might be due to a country’s legal system, the 
maturity of the consulting market, and the 
connectedness of the consulting community. Thus, the 
findings support modifying TRC to reflect moderation 
of its direct effects according to national differences. 
Furthermore, additional research needs to be done to 
resolve which aspect (or aspects) of the legal and social 
systems have the greatest moderating influences. 
We also note that the covariates, client experience with 
consultants, and perceived honesty of consultants, are 
significant in the overall MANOVA and some 
ANOVAs. We did not explore these variables further 
because of space limitations, but they should be 
examined in future research.  
Furthermore, the possible central role of tacit 
knowledge in determining opportunism needs further 
investigation. The idea that information asymmetry is 
the root cause of opportunism is nearly 50 years old, 
but the world is now more complex and globally 
networked. Hence, tacit knowledge is now often a 
more prominent factor in business relationships. 
Indeed, we could attribute the rise of IS consulting to 
the demand for tacit knowledge. Hence, we need to 
deepen our understanding of the connection between 
the characteristics of tacit knowledge and information 
asymmetry.  
For organizations, an information system constitutes 
an intervention intended to improve performance or 
solve problems, and over the last half century, such 
interventions have successfully raised productivity 
(Stiroh, 2002). These interventions are also a powerful 
tool for research because they test theories in realistic 
settings (Shneiderman, 2016). Opportunism, because 
of its linkage to information asymmetry, should be 
amenable to IS interventions to reduce its adverse 
effects, and this aligns with the idea of transparency in 
engagements in the public sector. During the bidding 
stage of an engagement for most US public sector 
entities (federal, state, and local), all organizational 
interactions with all bidders are a matter of public 
record and all bidders have access to the posted 
information. Further, once the engagement has started, 
all IS consultants are required by statute to post 
detailed reporting of the status of the project, project 
staffing, relevant deadlines and “burn rate” of funding. 
Thus, we encourage IS scholars to move beyond 
thinking of opportunism as a phenomenon whose 
effects we report, but rather as a problem amenable to 
amelioration through an IS intervention to reduce 
information asymmetry. 
5.1 Theoretical Advancement 
Based on our findings, which highlight the importance 
of tacit knowledge and information asymmetry (over 
explicit knowledge), and on our belief in promoting an 
IS interventionist approach to opportunism, as well as 
our analysis of the covariates (Table 4 and Table 5), 
client consultant experience and perceptions of 
consultants should be considered in future research as 
potential moderators of perceived constraint 
effectiveness. We propose a revised model for future 
research (Figure 2). The model revises TRC (Dawson 
et al., 2010) to emphasize the central role of tacit 
knowledge and stresses the need to understand how 
tacit knowledge influences constraint effectiveness via 
information asymmetry, and from this knowledge, asks 
what kind of IS interventions, possibly designed for 
national differences, could influence this relationship 
in different national contexts.  
With a better understanding of these influential factors 
and greater insight into the types of IS interventions 
that are most appropriate, IS scholars will be better 
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equipped to guide practice in terms of how IS could 
minimize opportunism in the context of business 
relationships. 
6 Conclusion 
6.1 Applicable Knowledge 
Because this study asked project managers to report on 
the effectiveness of different constraints under varying 
realistic situations, we have tapped practical 
knowledge and experience that has import for other 
project managers. We briefly summarize the key points 
of applicable knowledge generated by this research as: 
• When information asymmetry is high, use one 
or more social constraints. 
• When information asymmetry is low, use a legal 
constraint. 
• For the most complex engagement (IA-H, EK-
H, TK-H) use an advisor firm. 
• For the second most complex engagement (IA-
H, EK-L, TK-H) use an advisor firm in China 
and Saudi Arabia and rely on public reputation 
in the US. 
• Clients should seek opportunities to develop 
project-relevant tacit knowledge prior to a 
consulting engagement to lower information 
asymmetry. 
• Consultants should recognize that national 
differences can impact how clients select and 
deploy constraint options. 
6.2 Contributions 
This research makes several contributions. First, we 
show how engaged scholarship can advance both 
theory and practice. Theory testing in field settings or 
using methods that access deep field knowledge can 
reveal theory shortcomings and deliver results 
applicable to the improvement of practice. Too often, 
we opine, IS scholarship loses sight of its ultimate 
goal—the improvement of practice. Theory is a 
proximate goal and its testing in a practical setting 
contributes to achieving the ultimate purpose of 
creating social value by developing solutions to 
important social issues such as opportunism. Engaged 
scholarship is a bridge between theory and practice too 
seldom crossed but, as we demonstrate in this article, 
it is spanning methodology that can simultaneously 
strengthen both ends of the bridge—theory and 
practice.  
Second, we illustrate the need to consider national 
differences when testing agency theory and principal-
professional lens in the context of IS consulting. While 
we found support for these two theoretical foundations 
across the three nations, important differences exist 
and, by ignoring these differences, their explanatory 
power is compromised. Agency theory, which supports 
the use of legal constraints, explains the outcomes for 
China and Saudi Arabia but not for the US, which 
might be due to the perceived high costs of the litigious 
climate of the US The predictive power of agency 
theory could be enhanced by further examining it (1) 
in other nations, (2) with different legal and social 
combinations, and (3) contexts other than and 
including IS consulting. The principal-professional 
lens could also benefit from the inclusion of national 
setting. Despite the presence of strong social norms 
(like guanxi in China) and generally homogenous 
cultures and religions, China and Saudi Arabia 
generally perceive the effectiveness of social 
constraints to be lower than respondents in the US—a 
finding that does not support the principal-professional 
lens. However, we are uncertain if those in the US 
generally prefer social constraints as such, or whether 
this is a response to the perceived costs associated with 
the US legal system. Regardless of the causes, national 
differences matter. As a result, there is a clear need to 
add national differences to principal-professional 
theory.  
While we have identified situations where there is a 
general preference for a legal or social constraint, we 
don’t have sufficient granularity to explain, for 
example, the circumstance under which one type of 
legal constraint might be preferred over another. This 
depth of understanding and possible theoretical 
elaboration requires additional research to uncover the 
causality for specific constraint selection. 
Third, this research is based on an information-
centered theory, in that TRC’s three elements are about 
information-oriented concepts. Thus, this work is a 
contribution to the practice of IS consulting and the 
theoretical development of IS. By incorporating 
national differences, TRC has become more valuable 
and insightful for understanding IS consulting.  
Fourth, we provide practical findings for global 
corporations. Namely, when dealing with IS consulting 
firms, they should be wary of transporting successful 
constraint mechanisms from one nation directly to 
another. Instead, they need to observe local practices 
and adapt to those circumstances. 
6.3 Limitations 
Like all studies, this one has its limitations. First, while 
we developed the short scenarios from lengthy 
procurement documents and tested their realism, we 
did not test whether respondents reacted identically to 
the complete document as compared to the précis used 
as a scenario. Second, we did not attempt to control 
every potential explanatory condition, such as the 
consultant’s long-term goals vis-à-vis the client. There 
are some things that neither party will ever fully reveal, 
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but this is what makes constraints so critical in 
managing relationships and what makes research in 
this area important and challenging. Third, we 
acknowledge that we limited our focus to the initial 
encounter between the client and consultant. 
Subsequent encounters may yield different results. 
Finally, we acknowledge that the respondents are a 
convenience sample; however, all research favors one 
goal over another (McGrath, 1982). Since our primary 
goal was internal validity—as provided, for example, 
by a laboratory experiment—we were willing to lower 
external validity in the pursuit of causal precision, the 
dominant goal when manipulating stimuli and 
measuring outcomes. Clearly, our findings need to be 
examined across numerous countries to achieve 
sufficient external validity, but, for the first study of its 
kind, we argue that our sample is a good start. 
6.4 Concluding Comments 
It is surprising, given the prevalence of opportunism 
and the extensive research on agency theory, that there 
has been little investigation on national variations 
associated with constraining this very practical 
problem. While national circumstances vary, the need 
to constrain opportunism apparently does not, and 
firms should identify constraints that are effective for 
their settings and circumstances. In this study, we have 
enhanced our understanding of the influence of the 
national setting on this problem, and we recognize that 
further research is required to take this understanding 
of constraint mechanism to a deeper layer and generate 
more precise prescriptions for practitioners. 
Furthermore, we cannot identify anything peculiar to 
IS consulting that might suggest that different findings 
would emerge from examining other business 
relationships of a similar nature (e.g., a firm and its 
advertising agency). TRC, by synthesizing agency 
theory and the principal-professional lens, along with 
our addition of national setting as a moderating factor, 
offers a starting point for continued research on 
effective constraint mechanisms for other types of 
business relationships in potentially different national 
settings. 
The lessons from this study are clear: clients and 
consultants should not assume the generalizability of 
constraints across nations. Practitioners and academics 
should heed this lesson. As practice has become 
increasingly global, the demand to understand national 
differences has grown, and it is imperative that existing 
theories also be globalized (Boyacigiller & Adler, 
1991) in order to extinguish the parochialism that 
seems to persist in some of the best-known and 
respected theories. 
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Table A1. Common Legal and Social Constraints  
(Sources: Eisenhardt, 1989; Dawson et al., 2010; and Sharma, 1997) 
Social constraints Legal constraints 
Handshake agreements: Commonly used for low risk 
agreements between parties who share a common bond. 
Characterized by a lack of documentation but close social 
bonding.  
Informal communities: Although lacking legal standing, a 
social group can censor or “black ball” an opportunistic 
member of its community. This differs from clan control, 
which assumes no conflict of interest (Eisenhardt, 1989); an 
informal community makes no such assumption. 
Formal communities: Some formal bodies (e.g., law and 
medicine) can remove a person’s right to practice. Very 
effective when supported by the legal system 
Third-party control: Contracting with a third party to 
provide additional oversight. 
Bureaucratic control: Appealing to the higher management 
of the person performing the work.  
Religious codes: Guidance by religious texts that dictate 
appropriate behavior. Can be effective if both parties share a 
strong adherence to a common religion.  
Self-control: Argues that humans should have the will power 
to resist opportunism.  
Fixed-price contracts (FP): Specifies the amount of 
work to be done and establishes a specific price for 
the work. Are often outcome based and generally 
highly detailed and lengthy. 
Time and materials contracts (T&M): Specifies the 
number of hours of work to be performed at an 
hourly rate. Are somewhat lengthy but not as long as 
a FP contract. 
Purchase order: Precisely specifies the product to be 
delivered, the means of delivery, and the price. 
Generally, very concise. 
Incentive-based contracts: Specified monetary 
incentives for successfully performing the defined 
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Appendix B 
B1. Sample Scenarios (US Versions) 
Scenario 1: Complex Software Development of a COTS Financial System  
The organization (Client Firm) is undertaking a major effort that centers on the replacement of 70 current financial 
applications with a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) enterprise resource planning (ERP) suite to include a general 
ledger, accounts receivable, accounts payable and reporting functionality for a division of the organization. Client 
Firm, which has little idea about how to perform the work, has engaged Consulting Firm to perform this project.  
Key Facts: 
• The project is complex and large.  
• The project requires a great deal of knowledge about technology and how to apply that technology. 
• Client Firm knows very little about either the technology or how to approach the work. 
• Consulting Firm knows a great deal about the technology and how to approach the work. 
• Advisor Firm, which is precluded from performing the development work, is available, at a price, to advise 
Client Firm. 
Scenario 2: Assessment of Disaster Recovery Readiness  
Client Firm is a major bridge builder in the state of California and has been responsible for developing the engineering 
drawings that have been used to build major bridges within the state. These engineering drawings are useful to build 
the bridge but are also mandatory in the case of a seismic event (earthquake, etc.) that affects the bridge.  
The press has found out about Client Firm has never examined its disaster recovery readiness and headlines in local, 
regional, and national newspapers are calling it a dereliction of duty that this assessment has never been done. The 
California government has asked Client Firm to have Consulting Firm assess its readiness in the event of a seismic 
disaster. 
Key Facts: 
• The project is visible and important. 
• The project requires very little knowledge about the specifics of any particular technology but does require a 
great deal of knowledge about the management of technology. 
• Client Firm knows very little about how to approach the work. 
• Consulting Firm know a great deal about how to approach the work. 









Table C1. Statistical Measures 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max Range 
Experience 8.32 8.12 0 40 40 
Honesty 62.09 13.24 29.5 87.5 58 
Fixed-Price Contract (FP) 3.52 1.14 1 5 4 
Time and Materials Contract (TM) 3.42 1.12 1 5 4 
Purchase Order (PO) 3.33 1.11 1 5 4 
Incentive Contracts (IC) 3.41 1.14 1 5 4 
Advisor Firm (AF) 3.30 1.25 1 5 4 
Chain of Command (CC) 3.39 0.95 1 5 4 
Self-Control (SC) 3.35 1.00 1 5 4 
Professional Reputation (PR) 3.60 1.03 1 5 4 
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Table C2. Correlation Matrix (Correlation, Coefficient n, and p) 
 Experience Honesty FFP TM PO IC AF CC SC PR 

















































































































































Note: correlation coefficients in bold have p < .00125 because the Bonferroni correction for this correlation matrix 
with 40 cells is .05/40 = .00125. 
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